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HIS Article reviews case law developments in the area of wills, heir-
ship, estate administration, guardianships, and trusts. The Survey




In Estate of Johnson I the appeals court affirmed the trial court's admis-
sion of a subsequent will to probate and imposition of a constructive trust in
favor of the beneficiary of a previously executed joint and contractual will. 2
The decedent and his wife executed a joint, mutual, and contractual will in
1973. The decedent, without his wife's knowledge, later executed another
will in which he disposed of his property differently than under the joint will.
The executors under each will offered one will for probate and contested the
probate of the other will. The trial court admitted the later will to probate
and declared that the executor of the later will held the decedent's property
in a constructive trust for the benefit of the wife. The appeals court deter-
mined that the earlier will was joint, mutual, and contractual.3 The appeals
court agreed with the trial court that the later will revoked the testamentary
portions of the earlier will, but that the contractual provisions of the earlier
will mandated a constructive trust on the decedent's estate in order to ensure
specific performance of the contract in favor of the decedent's wife.4
In Dickson v. Simpson 5 the court determined that requiring the decedent's
alleged natural daughter to establish her right to inheritance under Probate
* B.A., University of Texas at Arlington; M.L.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University.
Attorney at Law, Taylor & Mizell, Dallas, Texas.
1. 781 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
2. Id at 394.
3. Id at 393. The court found that the earlier will contained express contractual lan-
guage in its preamble. Id. Additionally, the earlier will met the tests for a contractual will as
expressed in Jackson v. Stutt, 737 S.W.2d 597, 599 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ de-
nied): the will did not make an unconditional gift to the survivor and the will disposed of the
estate of both testators as one estate on the survivor's death. 781 S.W.2d at 393.
4. Id. at 394.
5. 781 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ granted).
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Code section 42(b) 6 did not deny the natural daughter equal protection. 7
The plaintiff, the alleged natural daughter of the decedent, sought to contest
the probate of the decedent's will as an heir of the decedent. The trial court
agreed with the decedent's widow that the plaintiff lacked standing to con-
test the will because the plaintiff had not proven that she could inherit under
any of the provisions of section 42(b). The appeals court affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the plaintiff's contest because the plaintiff had not re-
ceived a court order legitimating her within the four years of the statute of
limitations.8 Finally, the appeals court held that section 42(b) was "substan-
tially related to an important governmental objective" 9 and accordingly did
not violate plaintiff's due process under the fourteenth amendment.' 0
The appeals court in Candelier v. RingstaffI I upheld the trial court's
award of attorney's fees and expenses to the unsuccessful will proponent in a
will contest.' 2 Some months after the trial court announced its decision in
the will contest, but before the court entered its judgment, the court allowed
the proponent to file a motion for the award of attorney's fees and expenses
under Probate Code section 243.13 Approximately three months after the
proponent filed the motion requesting fees and expenses, the court scheduled
a hearing on both the proponent's request for fees and expenses and the
contestants' motion to enter judgment and to strike the proponent's plead-
ings for fees and expenses. The appeals court noted the length of time be-
tween the date the proponent filed the request and the date the court
approved the motion and held that the motion could not have surprised the
contestants. 14
6. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990). The legislature amended
§ 42(b) since the time of the decedent's death to allow natural children to establish paternity
during probate. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 464, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4085, 4086
(Vernon). At the time of the decedent's death, the natural daughter could establish paternity
in one of three ways under § 42(b):(a) if the child is born or conceived before or during the marriage of the child's
father and mother; or
(b) if the child is legitimated by a court decree as provided in Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 13.01; or
(c) if the father executed a statement of paternity.
Act of June 13, 1979, ch. 713, § 5, 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1740, 1743 (Vernon).
7. 781 S.W.2d at 727.
8. Id. at 725. According to the court the statute of limitations began to run on August
27, 1979, which was the first date on which the plaintiff had a statutory right to a court order
establishing paternity under the 1979 amendment to § 42(b). Id. The court also determined
that the four year general statute of limitations under TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.051 (Vernon 1986) applied to the plaintiff since § 42(b) did not include an express statute
of limitations for establishing paternity. 781 S.W.2d at 725.
9. Id. at 727.
10. Id.
11. 786 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ denied).
12. Id. at 44.
13. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 243 (Vernon Supp. 1990). Section 243 allows a person who
defends a will in good faith, whether or not that person is successful, to recover reasonable
attorney's fees and necessary expenses from the estate. Id.
14. 786 S.W.2d at 43-44. The court noted that the trial court can allow the parties to file
trial amendments until the trial court enters a final judgment unless the trial amendment
would surprise the opposing party. Id. at 43. The contestants did not complain that the
amendment surprised them or that they did not have sufficient time to prepare for the hearing.
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B. No Contest Clauses
Two courts examined no contest clauses during the Survey period.15 In
Hazen v. Cooper ' 6 the court held that the trial court erred in entering sum-
mary judgment denying a beneficiary her right to take under her mother's
will merely because she testified against the will's proponents during a will
contest. 17 In Estate of Newbill 8 the court determined that a beneficiary's
challenge of the suitability of the appointment of the named executor in the
will was not a contest that triggered the operation of the no contest clause in
the will. 19
C. Will Construction
In Estate of Robertson v. United States20 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit determined that a devise to the surviving spouse did not qualify
for the marital deduction for federal estate tax purposes21 because the devise
required that the spouse survive until the probate of the will.22 The decedent
left her separate property to her two daughters and her remaining property
to her husband, unless he did not survive her or he died prior to the time of
the probate of the will. The decedent's husband qualified as executor of the
estate and filed a federal estate tax return, claiming the marital deduction
under Internal Revenue Code section 205623 for all property devised to him.
The contestants also claimed on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the recov-
ery of expenses under TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 243 (Vernon Supp. 1990), but the contestants
failed to include the entire record from the trial court in the record submitted to the appeals
court. The court found that the contestants failed to meet their burden of proving reversible
error because they did not include in the record the entire statement of facts upon which the
trial court relied. 786 S.W.2d at 44.
15. Hazen v. Cooper, 786 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ);
Estate of Newbill, 781 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, no writ).
16. 786 S.W.2d at 519.
17. Id. at 520-21. The court found that the beneficiary testified without being served with
a subpoena. Id. at 520. The beneficiary contended, however, that she did not voluntarily
testify because the will contestants forced her to do so under threat of subpoena. The benefici-
ary was one of many witnesses who testified and the will contestants ultimately lost their
contest. The court stated that the mere fact that the beneficiary testified at the trial is insuffi-
cient to support the summary judgment against the beneficiary. Id. The court concluded that
summary judgment was incorrect because genuine issues of material fact concerning the valid-
ity of the beneficiary's testimony existed. Id. at 521.
18. 781 S.W.2d at 727.
19. Id. at 729. The beneficiary challenged the appointment of the named executor under
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 78(f) (Vernon 1980). The named executor had the burden to prove
to the court that he was qualified to serve, so the challenge did not place a greater burden upon
the executor than he already had under TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 81(a)(7) (Vernon Supp.
1990), which provides that the applicant must state and aver that the named executor is not
disqualified by law from receiving letters testamentary. The court found that the challenge to
the appointment of the named executor did not fall within the no contest clause because the
challenge was not brought in order to vary the terms of the will. 781 S.W.2d at 729. The court
also determined that because the beneficiary had not violated the no contest clause by challeng-
ing the appointment of the named executor, the beneficiary's good faith and probable cause in
bringing the challenge were not in issue. Id. at 730.
20. 903 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1990).
21. I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2056(b), 2056(b)(3) (1990).
22. 903 F.2d at 1038-39.
23. I.R.C. § 2056 (1990).
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The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the marital deduction because the
interest given to the husband under the will was a nonqualifying terminable
interest. An exception to the terminable interest rule provides that an inter-
est is not terminable if conditioned on the spouse's survival for a period of
less than six months and if the spouse actually survives beyond the period
provided in the will.24 Under Texas law, a will may be probated at any time
within four years from the date of death.25 The Fifth Circuit held that since
the express provisions of the will were not within the purview of section
2056(b)(3), the estate was not entitled to the marital deduction. 26 The court
stated that the will provided for the devise to the decedent's husband if he
survived her and if he survived until the probate of the will, the second of
which could occur more than six months after the decedent's death.27
In Opperman v. Anderson 28 the court construed a will and determined
that bequests of stock were specific bequests29 and that the sale of the stock
prior to the testator's death resulted in the ademption of the bequests of the
stock sold.30 The decedent made gifts of stock in three corporations to vari-
ous beneficiaries in her will. The decedent then devised her residuary estate
to one person. Prior to the decedent's death, she sold stock in Pabst Brewing
Co. and Houston Natural Gas Corporation, placing the proceeds from the
sales in separate bank accounts. The decedent owned shares of Houston
Natural Gas Corporation at the time of her death, but the estate redeemed
the stock following her death pursuant to a merger agreement. The probate
court found that no ademption occurred because the proceeds from the sales
of stock made prior to the decedent's death were readily identifiable. The
appeals court noted that the decedent expressed her intent that the stock
pass to specific beneficiaries under her will only if she owned the stock at the
time of her death.31 Because the decedent sold some of the stock prior to her
death, the appeals court found that these gifts were adeemed even though
the proceeds from the sales were readily identifiable. 32
D. Holographic Wills
In Hoover v. Sims 33 the court upheld the district court's order denying a
bill of review brought to set aside an order admitting a holographic will to
24. Id. § 2056(b)(3).
25. See TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 73(a) (Vernon 1980).
26. 903 F.2d at 1037.
27. Id at 1038-39.
28. 782 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
29. Id. at 10.
30. Id. at 11.
31. See id. The testator specifically stated in her will that the gifts were of stock, if any,
that she owned at the time of her death. See id. at 9.
32. Id. at 11. The court affirmed the trial court's determination that the proceeds from
the redemption of Houston Natural Gas Corporation stock made after the decedent's death
were not adeemed and passed under the specific bequest in the decedent's will. The court also
reversed the trial court's holding that the gifts of stock sold prior to the decedent's death were
adeemed and rendered judgment that the proceeds from those sales would pass under the will's
residuary clause. Id.
33. 792 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
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probate.34 The appellant alleged in his bill of review that the will was not
wholly in the decedent's handwriting because someone other than the dece-
dent had written a name on the will. 35 On appeal the appellant maintained
that the sworn bill of review provided conclusive proof that the will was not
wholly in the decedent's handwriting because the will proponent offered no
opposing proof. The court disagreed, finding that the bill of review alleged
no facts, but instead stated a conclusion of law.36 The dissent noted that the
record contained no evidence proving that the holographic will was wholly
in the decedent's handwriting, although Probate Code section 84(b) 37 re-
quires the sworn testimony or affidavits of two witnesses proving the authen-
ticity of the testator's handwriting. 38 The dissent would have reversed and
remanded the case to the trial court for testimony establishing the authentic-
ity of the handwriting.39
E. Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence
In Estate of Jernigan 40 the court found that sufficient evidence existed that
the decedent had testamentary capacity and that he was not under undue
influence when he executed his will.41 The decedent was ninety years old at
the time he signed his will. The decedent's son-in-law met with the lawyer
who drafted the will and told the lawyer what the decedent wished to in-
clude in his will. After drafting the will, the lawyer met with the decedent
and discussed the will paragraph by paragraph. The decedent did not sign
the will that day, but later returned to sign the will after considering it. The
will left one-fourth of the decedent's estate to each of the his three surviving
children, with the remaining one-fourth to be divided equally among the
children of his only deceased child. The witnesses and notary testified that
the decedent knew that he was signing his will and that no one exerted un-
due influence over him. Two days after the decedent died, his brother ified
an application for administration of the estate and subsequently contested
34. See Id. at 173.
35. The appellant also contended that the will failed to dispose of all of the decedent's
property, so that he was entitled to receive that property through intestacy. Id. at 174.
36. Id. at 173. The court also found that the trial court correctly construed the will to
dispose of all of the decedents property. Id. at 174. The appellant failed to meet his burden of
showing substantial error in the trial court's order construing the will to leave five bank ac-
counts to Eagle Lake Community Hospital when the appellant only offered evidence to show
that the decedeni died in a Houston hospital. The appellant offered no evidence at all to show
why the devise of a house would not include its contents.
37. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 84(b) (Vernon 1980).
38. 792 S.W.2d at 175 (Dunn, J., dissenting). The majority also noted that no one testi-
fied concerning the decedent's handwriting. Id at 173.
39. Id. at 175-76. The dissent would have found that the appellant had the burden to
show only that the record lacked the proof necessary to admit a holographic will, which the
appellant did in his bill of review. Id. at 175. Once the appellant established that proof, the
district court and the appeals court should have reviewed the record for statutory compliance.
If the handwriting had been proven according to Tax. PROB. CODE ANN. § 84(b) (Vernon
1980), the appellant would have had the higher burden of proof that the majority thrust upon
him, according to the dissent. See 792 S.W.2d at 175.
40. 793 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ).
41. Id. at 90.
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the probate of the will on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue
influence, and forgery. The court disagreed, finding sufficient evidence that
the testator had testamentary capacity, that he did not execute the will under
undue influence, and that sufficient evidence existed that the decedent signed
a valid will that could be admitted to probate.42 Finally, the court found
that the trial court's conclusion that the decedent's signature was not a for-
gery was not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.4 3
In Smallwood v. Jones44 the court affirmed the judgment n.o.v. of the pro-
bate court, finding that no more than a scintilla of evidence supported the
jury's finding of undue influence. 45 The testator left eighty percent of her
estate to one of her sisters and the remainder to her son. The testator exe-
cuted the will during a lengthy illness that, within a short time following a
stay at the sister's house, ultimately led to her death. The testator's two
sisters provided most of her care during her illness, since her son lived in a
different city. The son contested the probate of the will on the basis that the
sister exerted undue influence over the testator. The jury found that the
testator had testamentary capacity, but that she executed her will under the
undue influence of her sister. The probate court entered a judgment n.o.v.
and ordered the probate of the will. The appeals court determined that no
evidence supported the jury's finding of undue influence and affirmed the
probate court.46
F Revocation
In Pearce v. Meek 47 the court found that the proponent of an alleged will,
decedent's step-daughter, failed to overcome the presumption that the dece-
dent destroyed the will with the intention of revocation.48 The proponent
testified that the decedent had shown her his will some fourteen years prior
to his death and stated that he did not intend to change the will. The propo-
nent did not see the decedent again after he had shown her his will. The
42. Id. at 89. The court found that sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court's
judgment admitting the will even though the trial court did not accept the will into evidence
during the will contest. Id. The proponent offered the original will as evidence during the
trial, but the court ruled that admission of the will was unnecessary. Id The attorney who
drafted the will, the two witnesses and the notary public all gave testimony during the will
contest.
43. Id. at 90. The contestant relied on the fact that the decedent signed his first name
beginning with a lower case letter rather than a capital letter. The proponent introduced other
documents in which the decedent had signed his name in the same manner as he had signed
the will.
44. 794 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
45. Id. at 119.
46. Id. at 117. The court noted that a trial court can enter a judgment n.o.v. under TEX.
R. Civ. P. 301 (West Supp. 1990) only if a directed verdict would have been proper and if no
evidence supports the jury's finding.
47. 780 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, no writ).
48. Id. at 291. When a testator had possession of his will at the time that any other
person last saw the will and the will cannot be located after the decedent's death, a rebuttable
presumption arises that the testator destroyed the will with intent of revocation. Id. (citing




decedent remarried and, according to testimony offered at trial, he and his
new wife destroyed the will during a family argument. No one found a will
after the decedent's death. The trial court found that the decedent destroyed
the will with the intention of revocation, and the appeals court affirmed.49
The trial court also found that the decedent and the proponent's mother had
executed mutual wills prior to the mother's death, but that these wills were
not contractual. The appeals court found that the mother's will and similar
provisions in the decedent's alleged will did not show an intent between the
parties to dispose of their combined estates as one estate on the death of the
survivor5° and that the proponent failed to meet her burden of proving a
testamentary contract.51
II. HEIRSHIP
In an order determining heirship, the appeals court in Brown v. Gerson 52
ordered the trial court to delete two paragraphs that stated that the decedent
did not own an interest in real property at the time of her death.5 3 The
relator in the mandamus proceeding complained that the trial court failed to
follow the appeals court's judgment entered in a previous appeal of the case.
The relator, who is the decedent's daughter, brought an application to deter-
mine heirship. The trial court entered a judgment denying the application,
and the relator appealed. The appeals court, in an unpublished opinion, re-
versed and remanded the case with instructions to the trial court to enter
judgment declaring the decedent's heirs and their respective shares of the
estate. The trial court then entered judgment declaring the heirs and their
respective shares, but decreed that the decedent did not own any property at
the time of her death. The relator and others, however, had introduced evi-
dence sufficient to show that the decedent had an interest in real property at
the time of her death. Rather than appeal the trial court's order, the relator
filed a petition for writ of mandamus, which the appeals court originally
denied, but later allowed.54 The appeals court determined that the trial
court erred in not finding that the decedent owned property when the evi-
dence introduced established that she did." The dissent noted that the ap-
peals court should not have granted leave to file writ of mandamus.5 6
49. 780 S.W.2d at 291.
50. Id at 292.
51. Id at 294.
52. 782 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ).
53. Id. at 230.
54. Id
55. Id at 229. The court noted that an adverse witness's testimony supported the rela-
tor's evidence that the decedent died owning real property. Id. at 228. Because the court
found the record so clear, it concluded that the fact that the decedent died owning an interest
in real property was established as a matter of law. Id. at 229.
56. Id. at 230 (Burgess, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the appeals court did not
consider the issue concerning title to real property on the original appeal and that the trial
court complied with the appeals court's original order by entering a judgment determining
heirship. Id The dissent noted that the majority may have granted the petition in order to
correct its decision in the original appeal. Id.
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In Thompson v. Lawson 5 7 the court examined the issue of the effect of an
ineffective disclaimer under Texas Probate Code section 37A.58 The dece-
dent had three children from a previous marriage at the time he married his
second wife. The decedent and his second wife then had two children of
their own. The decedent died testate, leaving all his property to his second
wife. The widow filed a partial disclaimer in the probate court under which
she disclaimed some of the cash and real property. The plaintiffs, decedent's
three children from his first marriage, claimed that they were entitled to
three-fifths of the property that the widow disclaimed, and the trial court
granted their motion for summary judgment. The appeals court found that
a question of fact existed as to whether the widow executed the partial dis-
claimer after she had taken possession and exercised control over the dis-
claimed property, which would render the disclaimer ineffective.5 9 The
plaintiffs contended that even if the disclaimer were ineffective, it operated as
an assignment of the property to all five of the decedent's children because
the five children would have received the property if the widow had prede-
ceased the decedent. The court held that an ineffective disclaimer must sat-
isfy the provisions of Probate Code section 37B 60 in order to be an
assignment and, moreover, that an assignment that results from an ineffec-
tive disclaimer is a gift. 61 The court further held that because issues of fact
existed as to whether the disclaimer was effective and whether the widow
intended to make a gift of the property to the decedent's three children from




In Nelson v. Neal63 the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the appointment of
a temporary administrator." The decedent, a California resident, and
others died in a plane crash in Bowie County, Texas, on December 31, 1985.
The widow of one of the other men on the plane filed suit for wrongful death
against the decedent's estate in federal court. Shortly before the two year
statute of limitations ran, the widow applied to have the court appoint a
temporary administrator under Texas Probate Code section 13 1A65 for the
57. 793 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, writ denied).
58. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A (Vernon Supp. 1990).
59. Id. at 96. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A provides that a disclaimer is ineffective if it
is made after the beneficiary takes possession or exercises dominion and control over the
property.
60. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37B (Vernon Supp. 1990). Section 37B provides that a
person making the assignment may assign the property to any person. The assignment is a gift
and is not a disclaimer or renunciation. Id. § 37B(d).
61. 793 S.W.2d at 96. The widow stated in an affidavit that she had donative intent only
toward her two sons.
62. Id. at 97.
63. 787 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1990).
64. Id. at 344, 346.
65. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 131A (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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purpose of receiving service of process in the federal court case. The widow
did not allege in the verified application that the decedent died intestate, but
rather that she was unaware that the decedent had a will.
The probate court appointed a temporary administrator and the appeals
court affirmed the probate court.66 The supreme court found that the widow
alleged facts sufficient to establish an immediate necessity for administration
of the decedent's estate.67 The widow alleged in the verified application that
other judgment creditors could reach proceeds from a liability insurance pol-
icy covering the crash before she could serve her claim on the estate's per-
sonal representative. The appeals court determined that the proceeds of the
insurance policy were an asset of the decedent's estate that could support an
ancillary administration in Texas.68 The appeals court further determined
that the widow's wrongful death claims for herself and for her children were
two separate claims against the estate, thus showing a necessity for adminis-
tration.69 The supreme court agreed70 and considered the issue whether the
decedent died testate in Texas. 71 The widow alleged in her application that
she did not know whether the decedent died with a will. Probate Code sec-
tion 131A 72 provides that the application for a temporary administration
must include all of the information required by Probate Code section
82(b),73 including the allegation that the decedent died intestate. A majority
of the supreme court nevertheless held that the widow's allegation that she
did not know whether the decedent died with a will was sufficient to meet
the requirements of the Probate Code concerning the verified application.74
The majority also held that the widow met her burden of proof showing
the necessity for administration in the contested hearing on the appointment
of the temporary administrator because the probate court's order granting
the temporary administration was prima facie evidence of the necessity. 75
The dissent argued that the probate court should have voided the appoint-
ment of the temporary administrator because the widow could not swear in
66. 764 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988) aff'd, 787 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1990).
For a discussion of the appeals court's opinion in this case, see Candler, Wills and Trusts,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw.L.J. 301, 312-13 (1990).
67. 787 S.W.2d at 344.
68. 764 S.W.2d at 327.
69. See id.
70. 787 S.W.2d at 345.
71. Id. at 345-46. The decedent died testate and his will was admitted to probate in Cali-
fornia. The decedent's brother served as executor of the decedent's estate. The California
probate court sealed the probate records in the estate, and the widow claimed that she could
not determine whether the decedent died testate or intestate.
72. Tax. PROB. CODE ANN. § 131A (Vernon Supp. 1990).
73. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 82(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990). Section 82 lists the require-
ments for an application for letters of administration "when no will ... is alleged to exist." Id
Section 82(b) provides that the application must state that the decedent died intestate. Id.
74. 787 S.W.2d at 346. The majority determined that the widow was unable to prove
intestacy because the California court had sealed the decedent's probate records. Id. The
majority did not explain why they determined that the widow met the requirements of the
Probate Code in her application when she stated, on the face of the application, that she could
not swear that the decedent died intestate.
75. Id. The court found that neither party offered any evidence at the hearing, so the
court could review only the prima facie evidence of the probate court's order. Id.
19911
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her application that the decedent died intestate.76
B. Executors and Administrators
Three courts considered the removal of independent executors during the
Survey period.77 In Baker v. Hammett 78 the court reversed an order remov-
ing an independent executrix because the district court removed the execu-
trix for a reason other than any statutory reason.79 In Geeslin v.
McElhenney80 the court upheld the probate court's removal of an independ-
ent executor for gross mismanagement and misconduct.81 In Sales v. Pass-
76. Id. at 346-48 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting, joined by Gonzalez and Hecht, JJ.) The dis-
sent noted the discrepancy between the majority's finding that the widow failed to swear that
the decedent died intestate and its determination that her allegation was sufficient because she
could not determine the status of the estate from the California court records. Id. at 347. The
dissent noted that the widow could and should have inquired further with the estate's counsel
concerning the identity of the executor or administrator of the estate. Id. The dissent further
noted that appointment of the temporary administrator was not void at the time of service of
process in the federal suit, but was instead voidable. Id at 347-48. The dissent would have
held that the widow failed to meet her burden to prove the necessity of administration at the
contested hearing, so that the probate court should have removed the temporary administrator
at the time of the contested hearing. Id. at 348. The court appointed the temporary adminis-
trator on December 23, 1987. The temporary administrator received process in the federal suit
on January 11, 1988. The contested hearing occurred on January 13, 1988. The dissent noted
that TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 131A(i) (Vernon Supp. 1990) allows the temporary administra-
tor to act to the extent of the powers granted by the probate court in the time between appoint-
ment and the contested hearing. 787 S.W.2d at 347. Since the administrator received service
of process prior to the contested hearing, the dissent would have held that no reason existed for
the temporary administration to continue at the time of the hearing. Id. at 348.
77. Baker v. Hammett, 789 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ); Geeslin
v. McElhenney, 788 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ); Sales v. Passmore, 786
S.W.2d 35 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1990, writ dism'd by agr.).
78. 789 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ).
79. Id at 682, 685. The district court removed the independent executrix because she
failed to follow a court order directing her to distribute an estate. The appeals court found
that TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149C (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1990), which provides the statu-
tory grounds for removal of an independent executor, does not include failure to follow a court
order as a grounds for removal. 789 S.W.2d at 683. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 222 (Vernon
1980 & Supp. 1990) allows removal of a personal representative for failure to follow a court
order, but the court determined that § 222 does not apply to an independent administration
pursuant to TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 145(h) (Vernon 1980) and § 3(aa) (Vernon 1980). 789
S.W.2d at 685. The court found that only TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149B (Vernon 1980 &
Supp. 1990) provides for the mandatory distribution of an estate under independent adminis-
tration, and this section will apply only after the estate has been under administration for two
years. 789 S.W.2d at 685. Because the estate had not been under administration for two years
at the time the district court removed the independent executrix, the appeals court found that
the district court had no jurisdiction and no authority to enter its order. Id.
80. 788 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
81. Id. at 687. The independent executor failed to pay additional estate taxes at the first
opportunity after learning that the estate owed additional taxes. The executor instead used
proceeds received by the estate from the sale of land to pay executor's commissions and to
make distributions to beneficiaries. The executor's actions resulted in increased interest and,
ultimately, in a substantial penalty before the executor paid the tax, accrued interest and pen-
alty. The executor's actions thus cost the estate a great deal of money. The executor also
commingled estate funds with a pension plan, despite the executor's knowledge that commin-
gling the funds constituted a prohibited transaction. The probate court found these two ac-
tions sufficient to warrant removal of the executor under TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149C
(Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1990), which allows a court to remove an independent executor if proof
exists that the executor has been guilty of gross mismanagement or gross misconduct. The
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more82 the court affirmed the probate court's determination not to remove
an appointed co-independent executor who a beneficiary alleged to be a con-
victed felon.8 3
In Gatesville Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Jones84 the appeals court affirmed the trial
court's finding that an independent executor had no authority to execute a
long-term lease because the will did not provide the executor with that au-
thority and the lease was not in the best interests of the estate.8 5 Prior to her
death the decedent leased the surface of a portion of her real estate to Gates-
ville Redi-Mix, Inc. The lease had a primary term of five years with an op-
tion for the lessee to extend the term for an additional ten years. The
decedent named her son independent executor in her will, and he apparently
fully completed his duties as executor by July 1975, approximately a year
and a half after the decedent's death. In September 1981, following the expi-
ration of the primary term of the lease on the surface, but during the option
period, the son, acting as independent executor, signed a new lease with the
lessee. The five year primary term of the new lease began in March 1986, at
the end of the option period of the first lease, and the lease provided for an
additional ten year option. The independent executor died in March 1985;
the other beneficiaries of the estate were unaware of the new lease until after
the independent executor's death. The beneficiaries refused the lessee's first
payment and all subsequent payments tendered under the new lease. The
lessee sued to enforce the lease and the beneficiaries counterclaimed for use
of the land after the expiration of the original lease, restoration costs, and
attorney's fees. The court entered an instructed verdict for the beneficiaries
and allowed the jury to determine the compensation for use of the land, costs
for restoration of the land, and attorney's fees. The lessee appealed the trial
court's ruling that the independent executor did not have authority to exe-
cute the lease. The appeals court held that the same rule applying to an
appeals court found that the probate court justifiably removed the executor, it also upheld the
probate court's order limiting the amount of executor's commissions that the removed execu-
tor could receive. 788 S.W.2d at 687.
82. 786 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1990, writ dism'd by agr.).
83. Id at 37. A beneficiary of the estate sought to have the co-independent executor
removed after appointment because the co-independent executor was a convicted felon. TEx.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 78 (Vernon 1980) disqualifies a convicted felon from serving as an execu-
tor or administrator of an estate. The beneficiary received notice of the hearing wherein the
court appointed the co-independent administrator, but the beneficiary failed to contest the
appointment at that time. The beneficiary instead sought removal of the co-independent ad-
ministrator following appointment. The appeals court noted that after appointment an execu-
tor may be removed only under TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149C or § 222 (Vernon 1980 &
Supp. 1990). 786 S.W.2d at 36. The court noted that § 222 might not apply to independent
administrations, but that § 149C expressly applies to independent administrations. Id. at 37.
Section 149C allows removal of the executor if the executor "is sentenced to the penitentiary,"
TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149C(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1990), which indicates that the executor
must be sentenced after appointment to fall under this section of the Probate Code. The court
determined that § 149C applies subsequent to appointment as executor. 786 S.W.2d at 37.
The court also found that the probate court had jurisdiction to consider removal of the co-
independent executor, but that the probate court committed harmless error by not doing so.
Id
84. 787 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.-Waco 1990, writ denied).
85. Id. at 446.
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independent executor's sale of real property should apply to a lease 8 6 The
lessee relied upon Probate Code section 36187 as authority for the independ-
ent executor to lease the property, but the appeals court found that the lease
did not meet the best interests of the estate.88
In Anderson v. Oden 8 9 the court held that the county court properly al-
lowed reimbursement of an executor and his brother when no one objected
to the reimbursement prior to the time that the court ordered the reimburse-
ment.90 The decedent left a holographic will in which she named one of her
sons executor. The decedent's undivided one-half interest in a parcel of real
property constituted the largest single asset in her estate. The decedent's five
children owned the other undivided one-half of the real property through
inheritance from their father. Prior to the decedent's death, two of her sons,
including the son named executor in the will, paid past due ad valorem taxes
on the property. These same two sons paid the decedent's funeral expenses,
expenses of her last illness, and the costs of estate administration. Following
the decedent's death, one of the five children assigned the appellant his undi-
vided one-fifth interest in the property. The two sons applied for reimburse-
ment for the taxes paid prior to the decedent's death and the other prior
expenses they had paid. The two sons, however, did not present their appli-
cation for reimbursement in the manner specified by the Probate Code. 91
The trial court determined that the expenses were necessary, that the es-
tate did not have sufficient funds to reimburse the two sons, and that the two
sons should be reimbursed from the proceeds of the sale of the decedent's
one-half interest in the real property. The appellant did not contest the re-
imbursement prior to the time of the trial court's order. The appellant con-
tended on appeal that the application for reimbursement of the two sons did
not meet the requirements of the Probate Code92 and, thus, the court inval-
idly ordered reimbursement. The appeals court held that the appellant did
not preserve a complaint for appellate review because he did not object to
86. Id at 445. If a will does not authorize the independent executor to sell real property,
the sale must be made under the same conditions that would result in a probate court's order
of sale in a dependent administration. See id.
87. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 361 (Vernon 1980) allows personal representatives to apply
to the court for leases longer than one year; the court may allow the lease if the lease would
serve the estate's best interests.
88. 787 S.W.2d at 445, 446. The court specifically noted that the independent executor
entered the lease seven years following the decedent's death, the time that title to the property
vested in the beneficiaries under TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37 (Vernon Supp. 1990), and that
the lease would not begin until eleven years after title vested in the beneficiaries. 787 S.W.2d at
445. Additionally, the court noted that the lease term could be extended at the lessee's option
to twenty-six years after title to the property vested in the beneficiaries, even though the estate
had no necessity for the lease at the time the executor entered into the lease. Id. The court
accordingly held that the lease was not in the best interests of the estate. Id. at 446.
89. 780 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
90. Id. at 466.
91. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 301 (Vernon 1980) provides that an affidavit must support
written claims against an estate. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 317 (Vernon 1980) provides that a
personal representative of an estate must file an affidavit with his claim against the decedent
within six months of issuance of letters testamentary or letters of administration.
92. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 301, 317 (Vernon 1980). See supra note 91.
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the reimbursement prior to the trial court's order.93
In Whitaker v. Huffaker94 the court determined that the decedent's two
children did not have a claim for a breach of fiduciary duty against their
attorney as executor of their father's estate because the probate court had
not appointed an executor.95 The decedent's two children and his surviving
spouse began arguing concerning the separate and community nature of the
decedent's estate immediately following his death. Attorneys for the chil-
dren and the widow suggested a settlement between the parties to save ex-
pense and avoid litigation. The parties entered into a preliminary settlement
agreement wherein they agreed to probate the decedent's will as a muniment
of title. The widow and the children gave their attorneys wide power to
gather and manage estate assets pending a final settlement. Some time later
the parties entered a final settlement. The two children subsequently re-
voked the powers of attorney under which the attorneys operated and con-
sulted another attorney because of their dissatisfaction with the settlement of
the estate. The children sought to recover from their attorney, alleging a
breach of duty as an executor of the estate. The appeals court held that the
trial court properly granted summary judgment against the children on this
issue because the probate court never appointed an executor.96
In Rice v. Gregory97 the court found that sufficient evidence existed that
the executor converted property that did not belong to the estate9" and that
the trial court thus correctly entered judgment against the executor both
individually and in his capacity as the independent executor.99 The decedent
received a life estate in corporate stock under the terms of her mother's will.
The decedent's mother left the remainder interest in the corporate stock
equally to the decedent's brother and sister. The decedent may have been
under the impression that she and her siblings entered into a verbal agree-
ment to disregard the mother's will and allow the decedent to own the stock
outright. The jury concluded that the siblings did not enter into such an
agreement and that the executor, individually and in his capacity as execu-
93. 780 S.W.2d at 466. The court found the appellant's complaint that the four year
statute of limitations barred the claims for reimbursement was meritless. Id. at 467. The sons
paid all of the expenses for which they sought reimbursement in 1984 and 1985. The sons filed
their application for reimbursement in 1987. Accordingly, the four years of the statute had not
run at the time the sons filed the application for reimbursement.
94. 790 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied).
95. Id at 764.
96. Id. The court additionally held that the fact that the widow and two attorneys did not
attach new affidavits to their amended summary judgment motions did not result in fatal error.
Id. at 763. The court noted that the trial court should consider all affidavits in connection with
amended motions, that the children did not complain about the lack of new affidavits in the
trial court, and that the pleadings and depositions included in the amended motions supported
the summary judgment even without considering the affidavits. Id. at 763-64. The court also
held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment against the children in their
claim for breach of contract against their stepmother because the initial settlement agreement
did not provide for distributions to the children, and for their claim that the two attorneys and
the stepmother conspired to defraud the children of their inheritance. Id at 764-66.
97. 780 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
98. Id. at 387.
99. Id. at 389.
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tor, converted the stock when he distributed it to individuals other than the
decedent's brother. 100 The court found that the brother properly brought
suit against the executor in his fiduciary capacity because the executor had
not closed the estate administration pursuant to Probate Code section 15110
or section 152102 prior to the time the brother brought the action. 0 3 The
court found that the executor converted the property individually and as
executor and that the estate was jointly liable with the executor for the
conversion. 104
C. Family Allowance
In Churchill v. Churchill 105 the court upheld the probate court's award of
a family allowance to the decedent's surviving spouse.10 6 The co-executors
of the decedent's estate appealed the award of a $30,000 family allowance.
They contended that the decedent provided adequately for his spouse under
his will, the spouse had to elect whether to receive the family allowance or
her benefits under the will, the spouse had adequate separate property to
provide for her needs, and no evidence existed that she had inadequate sepa-
rate property to provide for her needs. The appeals court found the will
neither explicitly nor implicitly limited the surviving spouse's rights to the
statutory family allowance.10 7 The court also found that the spouse did not
have to elect to receive her benefits under the will or, in the alternative, to
receive the family allowance because the award of the family allowance
would not thwart the testator's intent in the will.108 The court also found
the surviving spouse entitled to a family allowance since she lacked adequate
separate property to provide for her support in the year immediately follow-
ing her husband's death.10 9 Finally, the court held that the amount of the
100. The decedent included the stock in her will and left most of it to her sister. She also
left some of the stock to her husband, who served as executor, to her husband's two children
from a former marriage and to her brother's two daughters. The executor distributed the
stock pursuant to the bequests in the decedent's will rather than under the terms of the dece-
dent's mother's will.
101. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 151 (Vernon 1980).
102. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 152 (Vernon 1980).
103. 780 S.W.2d 384, 388. The court also found that the trial court correctly awarded
prejudgment interest from a single date because evidence showed that the executor converted
the stock both before and after the selected date. Id. The court found that the conversion
could have occurred as early as the date the executor filed the inventory in the estate because
he included all of the stock in the inventory. Id. The court also upheld the jury's finding that
the executor willfully acted in a wrongful manner when he converted the stock. Id.
104. Id. at 389. The court found that joint liability especially applies when, as here, the
decedent purported to give more than her life estate in her will. Id. The court also upheld the
trial court's award of attorney's fees, including the fees for the conversion issue that would not
ordinarily result in attorney's fees, because the executor failed to object to the testimony con-
cerning attorney's fees at trial. Id.
105. 780 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
106. Id. at 917.
107. Id. at 915.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 916. The dissent would have found that the spouse was not entitled to a family
allowance because she gave her daughter a house, which was her separate property, following
her husband's death. Id. at 917. The house generated $300 per month in rental income and
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family allowance was not excessive under the circumstances. 10
D. Claims Against the Estate
In Wesley v. Pickard I I I the court held that the decedent's former spouse
was not entitled to receive contractual alimony following the decedent's
death.112 The consent judgment in the divorce contained a contract for ali-
mony payments. The contract provided four reasons for termination of the
alimony, but none included the death of the former husband. The parties
added a handwritten interlineation, however, that stated that alimony due
and unpaid through a specified date, which occurred more than two years
prior to the husband's death, would be an obligation of his estate. The trial
court ordered the temporary administrator of the estate to pay the former
wife contractual alimony for the time after the decedent's death. The tempo-
rary administrator appealed, and the appeals court found that the trial court
erred in finding that the contract required payment after the date of the
decedent's death.'1 3
Two courts examined secured claims in the context of independent admin-
istration. 114 In Texas Commerce Bank-Austin, N.A. v. Estate of Cox 115 the
court found that Probate Code section 306116 does not apply to independent
was worth $51,000. The dissent would have had the spouse sell the house in order to provide
for her support during the year following her husband's death. Id
110. 780 S.W.2d at 917.
111. 783 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1990, no writ).
112. Id at 592.
113. Id The appeals court stated that the reasonable interpretation of the handwritten
addition to the contract was that the decedent's estate would only be obligated through the
date given in the interlineation. Id. at 591-92. Since the decedent survived that date, his estate
had no obligation to his former wife.
114. Texas Commerce Bank-Austin, N.A. v. Estate of Cox, 783 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1989, writ denied); Joffrion v. Texas Bank of Tatum, 780 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1989, writ dism'd by agr.).
115. 783 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
116. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306 (Vernon 1980). Section 306 provides the methods
under which creditors present secured claims in a dependent administration. Section 306(a)
provides that the creditor should specify the method in which the claim should be handled by
the personal representative:
(1) Whether it is desired to have the claim allowed and approved as a matured
secured claim to be paid in due course of administration, in which event it
shall be so paid if allowed and approved; or(2) Whether it is desired to have the claim allowed, approved, and fixed as a
preferred debt and lien against the specific property securing the indebted-
ness and paid according to the terms of the contract which secured the lien,
in which event it shall be so allowed and approved if it is a valid lien; pro-
vided, however, that the personal representative may pay said claim prior to
maturity if it is for the best interest of the estate to do so.
Id. § 306(a). If a creditor presents the claim as a preferred debt and lien against the secured
property, the creditor cannot make a claim against assets of the estate other than the collateral.
Id Section 306(c) provides as follows:
When an indebtedness has been allowed and approved under Paragraph (2) of
Subsection (a) hereof, no further claim shall be made against other assets of the
estate by reason thereof, but the same thereafter shall remain a preferred lien
against the property securing same, and the property shall remain security for




administrations.11 7 The creditor foreclosed on a piece of real property when
the independent executor failed to make payment on the note in question.
The creditor used the proceeds from the foreclosure sale and from certifi-
cates of deposit also used as collateral on the note to offset the indebtedness.
When the creditor sought an accounting from the probate court, the probate
court found that the creditor did not have standing. The creditor appealed,
and the appeals court found that the creditor did not elect to have the debt
treated as a preferred debt and lien because section 306 does not apply to
independent administrations, that the creditor could pursue the deficiency
resulting from the foreclosure against the independent executor, and, ac-
cordingly, that the creditor had standing as an interested party to demand an
accounting. 11 In Joffrion v. Texas State Bank of Tatum 119 the appeals
court considered whether Probate Code section 306120 applies to independ-
ent administrations and reached the same conclusion12' as the court in Es-
tate of Cox. 122 The supreme court, however, later vacated the court of
appeals' opinion and remanded the case to the trial court to enter judgment
pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement.1 23
In San Antonio Savings Association v. Palmer'24 the court held that the
transfer of real property to a specially created corporation in exchange for
corporate stock and mortgage bonds was proper under Probate Code sec-
tions 230125 and 234126 and that the Probate Code accordingly did not re-
quire a report of sale and resulting confirmation of sale.127 Prior to
decedent's death, the probate court appointed a guardian of her estate be-
cause the decedent was no longer able to care for herself. The decedent had
few liquid assets, but owned a large tract of land in San Antonio. The guard-
ian determined that once the decedent died, her estate would be unable to
pay estate and inheritance taxes without a forced sale of the real property.
The guardian worked with the persons who would be the ward's heirs and
their respective attorneys and developed an estate plan under which the de-
cedent's estate would obtain the liquidity to pay the taxes and still retain the
Id.
117. 783 S.W.2d at 19.
118. Id.
119. 780 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ dism'd by agr.).
120. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306 (Vernon 1980).
121. 780 S.W.2d at 453. The facts in Joffrion closely parallel those in Estate of Cox. The
secured creditor foreclosed on the real property when the independent executor failed to pay
off the note on the due date. The creditor then sought recovery of the deficiency against the
independent executor, but the independent executor rejected the claim for the deficiency. The
trial court granted judgment in favor of the creditor in the amount of the deficiency and attor-
ney's fees; the independent executor appealed.
122. 783 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
123. 792 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1990).
124. 780 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
125. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 230 (Vernon 1980). Section 230 provides the duties that a
personal representative has in connection with the estate. Section 230(b) specifically lists the
duties and powers that a guardian has in connection with the ward's estate.
126. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 234 (Vernon 1980). This section enumerates powers that a
personal representative can exercise with and without court supervision.
127. 780 S.W.2d at 808.
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real property. The guardian obtained the probate court's approval of the
plan approximately three weeks prior to the decedent's death. The plan
called for the creation of a corporation to own all of the decedent's real
property. In exchange for the transfer of the real property to the corpora-
tion, the corporation issued the guardianship estate preferred and common
stock in the corporation and general mortgage bonds issued by the corpora-
tion. The corporation als6 executed a deed of trust on the real property to
secure the mortgage bonds. The guardian approached San Antonio Savings
Association about purchasing the mortgage bonds. The ward died prior to
the time San Antonio Savings agreed to purchase the bonds and the guardi-
anship proceeding terminated pending the filing of a final account. The
court appointed the trust company that served as guardian as temporary
administrator of the decedent's estate and specifically gave the temporary
administrator the power to complete the previously approved estate plan.
San Antonio Savings then issued a commitment letter in which it agreed to
purchase the mortgage bonds from the decedent's estate in cash. The deed
of trust previously executed by the corporation secured payment on the
bonds. The probate court authorized the bond sale and the parties consum-
mated the sales transaction. Subsequently, the estate failed to pay the initial
interest payment on the bonds and San Antonio Savings demanded payment.
When the estate again failed to make the interest payment, San Antonio
Savings posted the property for foreclosure. The heirs and the independent
administrator of the estate, who was an individual and not the trust com-
pany that served as guardian and temporary administrator, sought to enjoin
the foreclosure. The probate court, in a summary judgment, found void the
guardian's transfer of the real property to the corporation, the temporary
administrator's sale of the mortgage bonds to San Antonio Savings, and the
debt that the decedent's estate incurred in connection with the sale of the
bonds. The probate court issued a permanent injunction against San
Antonio Savings enjoining the foreclosure or attempted foreclosure of the
property, because the guardian did not file a report of sale reporting the
transfer of the real property to the corporation and the temporary adminis-
trator did not file a report of sale reporting the sale of the mortgage bonds to
San Antonio Savings. Because the guardian and the temporary administra-
tor did not fie reports of sale, the probate court did not enter orders con-
firming the sales. The appeals court disagreed and found that the transfer of
real property to the corporation and the sale of the mortgage bonds were not
the types of transactions that Probate Code sections 331 through 35828 con-
templated.129 The guardian and the temporary administrator fully apprised
the probate court of the proposed actions prior to taking those actions and
received court approval to do so. The probate court knew the sales price and
the purchaser prior to the sale of the mortgage bonds. The appeals court
128. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 331-358 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1990). These sections
allow personal representatives to sell estate property under proper court supervision. The
court supervision and the procedural steps outlined in these sections protect the estate.
129. 780 S.W.2d at 807.
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found that requirement of a report of sale and the resulting decree confirm-
ing the sale would be "superfluous."' 130 Additionally, the court found that
the transfer of the real property to the corporation in exchange for stock and
mortgage bonds was not a sale, but an exchange, and that Probate Code
section 234(a)(1) 131 applied to the exchange.132 The court found that be-
cause the transfer of real property was an exchange duly authorized by the
court, the guardian did not have to file a report of sale or seek an order
confirming the sale.t 33 Although the temporary administrator of the dece-
dent's estate did not make a report of the sale and seek an order confirming
the sale, the appeals court held that the probate court's approval of the
guardianship estate's final account, which included information concerning
the sale of the bonds, served as confirmation of the bond sale.134 The court
further held that the probate court erred in granting summary judgment to
the decedent's heirs and the independent administrator.1 35 Finally, the
court held that the heirs and independent administrator could not challenge
the lien and the debt because of equitable estoppel.' 36
E. Jurisdiction
In Owens v. Moore 137 the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to issue a
writ of mandamus.1 38 The executor of the estate in question filed a plea to
the jurisdiction in Harris County district court, contending that the court
had no jurisdiction because an ancillary probate proceeding was pending in
Val Verde County court. The appeals court noted that the claims pending in
the Harris County district court had not been brought before the Val Verde
court.139 The court also noted that it did not possess jurisdiction to issue a
writ of mandamus because the parties could receive an adequate remedy
through the appeal process. 4° The court found that the Harris County
court did not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Val Verde court and that
130. Id.
131. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 234(a)(1) (Vernon 1980) provides that a personal represen-
tative may "[plurchase or exchange property" upon application to the court and a court order
approving the action.
132. 780 S.W.2d at 808.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 809.
135. Id. The court found that the guardian's transfer of the real property to the corpora-
tion, execution of the deed of trust to secure payment on the bonds, and the temporary admin-
istrator's sale of the bonds to San Antonio Savings were all valid acts under the Probate Code.
Id.
136. Id. at 809. The majority stated that the heirs and independent administrator
presented a "case of estoppel by election... based on the principle that a person will not be
permitted to accept the beneficial part of a transaction and repudiate the disadvantageous
part." Id. The heirs and independent administrator sought to retain both the money San
Antonio Savings paid for the mortgage notes and the real property. The majority found this
unconscionable. Id. at 810. Justice Cadena, in a concurring opinion, criticized the majority's
conclusion that the case was one of estoppel because the facts failed to show any elements of
estoppel. Id.
137. 778 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. App.-Houston [st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
138. Id. at 153.
139. Id. at 152.
140. Id. at 152 n.I.
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the Val Verde court did not acquire jurisdiction over the controversy pend-
ing in the Harris County court; therefore, no conffict existed between the
jurisdiction of the two courts.1 41
F. Bills of Review
Two courts examined bills of review during the Survey period.142 In
Ortega v. First RepublicBank Fort Worth, N.A. 143 the court held that the
petitioners were not entitled to a bill of review as a matter of law.'" In
McDonald v. Carroll 1 4 5 the court found that the lower court erred in enter-
ing summary judgment against the petitioner's bill of review when the bill of
review contained evidence of all essential elements necessary to prove that
the original judgment was in error. 146
141. Id.
142. Ortega v. First RepublicBank Fort Worth, N.A., 792 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1990); Mc-
Donald v. Carroll, 783 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
143. 792 S.W.2d 452 (rex. 1990).
144. Id at 456. The petitioners were two adopted daughters of Eva Duane Jackson. Jack-
son's grandfather established a trust in his will for the benefit of Jackson's children. In 1963,
nine years following the testator's death, the trustee of the testamentary trust sought a declara-
tory judgment as to whether Jackson's adopted children were beneficiaries of the trust. The
trial court in the 1963 proceeding, affirmed by the court of appeals, determined that only
Jackson's natural children were beneficiaries of her grandfather's testamentary trust. Jack-
son's adopted children filed a bill of review and declaratory judgment action more than twenty
years after the first ruling. The Texas Supreme Court noted that a party to a previous action
brings a bill of review to set aside the judgment when the original judgment may no longer be
appealed due to the passage of time. Id. at 453 (citing Transworld Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Briscoe,
722 S.W.2d 407, 407 (Tex. 1987)). To obtain a bill of review, the petitioner must prove that he
has a valid claim or defense that he was unable to make at the first trial because of the other
party and without the petitioner being at fault or negligent. 792 S.W.2d at 453. The supreme
court found that the adopted children did not have a meritorious defense because the earlier
decision found that the testator intended to include only natural born children of his grand-
daughter as beneficiaries of the trust. Id at 454. The court also found that the adopted chil-
dren failed to prove that the other party to the proceeding prevented the guardian ad litem
appointed to represent them from making the defense and that the guardian ad litem did not
fully represent their interests. Id. at 454-55. Finally, the court found that the 1963 judgment
served as res judicata to their contentions that they are contingent remainder beneficiaries of
the testamentary trust. Id. at 456.
145. 783 S.W.2d 286 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
146. Id. at 288. The petitioner was the only son of the decedent, who was also survived by
her husband, the petitioner's step-father. The step-father served as administrator of the dece-
dent's estate. The administrator's final account showed community property worth
$157,561.25. The final settlement, also filed with the probate court, showed that the son re-
ceived $42,293.88 and the administrator received $115,267.37. The probate court entered an
order closing the estate and discharging the administrator. Less than two years later, the son
filed a statutory bill of review, alleging that he was entitled to one-half of the community estate
under TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 45 (Vernon 1980) as his mother's sole heir. The probate
court denied the son's motion for summary judgment and granted the administrator's motion
for summary judgment. The appeals court found that a statutory bill of review under TEx.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 31 (Vernon 1980) is a proper method of questioning the probate court's
order closing the estate and that to rule otherwise would destroy the effect of § 31. See 783
S.W.2d at 287. The court next determined that the son did not release his claims against the
estate by signing a release and receipt stating that his distribution completely satisfied his inter-
est in the estate because the release was without consideration. Id. Finally, the court found
that the probate court's order approving the distribution of the estate was in error because it




A. Removal of Guardian
In Mireles v. Alvarez 147 the appeals court reversed the trial court's deci-
sion that the appointment of a guardian was proper and rendered judgment
removing the guardian. 148 A 1981 automobile accident left the ward physi-
cally and mentally incompetent. The ward's husband filed a lawsuit for
damages resulting from the 1981 accident, in which he alleged damages both
for his wife as her next friend and for himself. The husband later applied for
appointment as his wife's guardian, and the court granted letters of guardi-
anship. The ward's mother subsequently filed a petition seeking removal of
the husband as the wife's guardian and requesting that she be named guard-
ian. The trial court denied the mother's petition and she appealed. The
appeals court analyzed Probate Code section 110,149 which provides grounds
for disqualification of a person as guardian. 150 Probate Code section l10(d)
provides that a person cannot qualify to serve as guardian if that person is a
party to a lawsuit that directly affects the welfare of the proposed ward.'
51
The appeals court, however, erred in analyzing section 110, which applies
only prior to appointment. The court should have analyzed Probate Code
section 222,152 which addresses the removal of a guardian after appointment.
Section 222 does not include as a ground for removal the guardian being
party to a lawsuit affecting the ward. 153 Additionally, the court failed to
acknowledge that Rule 173 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 154 antici-
pates a guardian bringing a legal action, which affects both the ward and the
guardian and in which the guardian may have an interest adverse to the
ward. Instead, Rule 173 mandates the appointment of a guardian ad litem
to represent the ward's interests in the lawsuit.
B. Limited Guardianship
In Eddins v. Estate ofSievers, NCM ss the appeals court affirmed the trial
court's ruling denying a limited guardianship and continuing a full guardian-
ship. 156 The court first discussed the standard for granting a limited guardi-
anship,' 57 then discussed the record.' 58 The court found that even though
some evidence demonstrated that the ward could perform some, although
147. 789 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
148. Id. at 948.
149. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 110 (Vernon 1980).
150. 789 S.W.2d at 948.
151. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § l10(d) (Vernon 1980).
152. Id. § 222 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1990).
153. Id.
154. TEX. R. Civ. P. 173 (West 1990).
155. 789 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
156. Id. at 707.
157. Id. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 130G(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990) provides that the appli-
cant must prove each element necessary for the creation of a limited guardianship by clear and
convincing evidence. The applicant must also submit a plan setting forth all duties and powers
of the limited guardian. Id. § 130H.
158. 789 S.W.2d at 707.
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not all, of the tasks required to care for himself, sufficient evidence also sup-
ported the continuation of the full guardianship. 159 The court also found
that the applicant failed to provide a plan for the limited guardianship. 160
C. Jurisdiction
In Gutierrez v. Estate of Gutierrez161 the court held that the probate court
loses all jurisdiction over a guardianship except for the settlement of the
guardianship estate following the death of the ward.' 62 In this case a succes-
sor guardian brought suit in June 1987 against the previously removed
guardian for costs of the removal action and damages resulting from the
previous guardian's breach of fiduciary duty. The ward died in April 1988,
prior to the time the previous guardian was served by substituted service. In
October 1988 the trial court granted a default judgment against the previous
guardian. The previous guardian appealed, alleging that the trial court lost
jurisdiction in the guardianship due to the death of the ward. The appeals
court agreed with the appellant, stating that, upon the death of the ward, the
trial court lost all jurisdiction in the guardianship except for requiring the
guardian to file a final account and settle the guardianship estate.1 63
V. TRUSTS
A. Creation of Trust
The federal district court, in Thompson v. Sundholm,1 " found that a fa-
ther did not create an express trust for his two children under Texas law by
delivering a check to their mother.1 65 The cashier's check involved was
made out to a third party and endorsed in such a manner that the funds were
subsequently deposited in accounts for the children. The check was not en-
dorsed to the mother as trustee for the children, nor did the father introduce
any evidence that the third party intended to create a trust for the benefit of
the children. The father was not the maker, payee, or endorser of the check.
The court found that the father did not create an express trust under Texas




161. 786 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
162. Id. at 113.
163. Id. The court held the default judgment void because the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to render judgment following the death of the ward. Id.
164. 726 F. Supp. 147 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
165. Id. at 150.
166. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.001(2) (Vernon 1984).
167. 726 F. Supp. at 150. The court also found that the delivery of the check to the mother
failed to create a gift to the minor children under the Texas Uniform Gifts to Minors Act,
TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 141.001 et seq. (Vernon 1984). 726 F. Supp. at 150. The court
reasoned that the check was not endorsed to the mother as custodian for the minor in the
manner prescribed by § 141.004(d) and that the gift was to two minors, whereas a gift under




In Marshall v. Marshall 168 the court found that the grantor failed to cre-
ate a valid trust because he did not deliver the stock certificates that were to
comprise the trust corpus to the trustees. 169 The trust agreement, which
purported to create an irrevocable trust, stated that the grantor transferred
certain property, listed on an attached schedule, to the trustees. The sched-
ule recited that the grantor transferred 5000 shares of stock to the trustees.
The grantor neither delivered the shares to the trustees, nor endorsed the
certificates and forwarded them to the corporation for reissuance to the
trustees. The grantor later sought to dissolve the trust, but the trustees
brought an action for declaratory judgment to find the trust valid. The ap-
peals court affirmed the trial court's finding that the grantor failed to create
a valid trust because he failed to deliver any property to the trustees.170
B. Beneficial Interests
In Furnace v. Furnace 1 the court held that when shareholders in a cor-
poration sold their stock they lost their beneficial interests in a mineral trust
formed by the corporation for the benefit of its shareholders. 172 The corpo-
ration created the trust to hold the mineral interests acquired by the corpo-
ration when it purchased real property. The shareholders of the corporation
were all members of one family. In 1980 one of the brothers determined that
he and his children should sell their corporate stock in order to minimize
family discord. At a shareholders meeting during which the shareholders
discussed the sale, this brother stated that the sale of the stock would not
result in a loss of beneficial interest in the trust. One of his brothers dis-
agreed, but no one actually read the trust agreement to determine its mean-
ing. The nephew who purchased the stock continued to make distributions
from the trust to the family members who had sold him their stock for ap-
proximately four years. After four years the nephew reviewed the trust
agreement and determined that the former shareholders were no longer ben-
eficiaries of the trust. The former shareholders brought this action to deter-
mine their beneficial interests. The jury found that the beneficial interests in
the mineral trust belonged to shareholders in the corporation as an incident
of ownership of the stock, and the appeals court held that this finding was
not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. 173
168. 786 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ).
169. Id. at 494.
170. Id. The appeals court cited TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.001(2) (Vernon 1984) for
the proposition that the transfer of property to another as trustee creates a valid inter vivos
trust. 786 S.W.2d at 493. The court found that because the grantor neither delivered the stock
certificates to the trustees nor surrendered the stock certificates to the corporation for reissu-
ance to the trustees, the grantor did not deliver the stock certificates to the trustees. Id at 494.
171. 783 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
172. Id. at 685-86. The court determined that the jury did not unjustly or erroneously find
that the shareholders sold their beneficial interests in the mineral trust when they sold their
shares in the corporation. Id. at 686. The trust agreement stated in three places that it was
created for the benefit of present and future shareholders.




In Nacol v. State 174 the court held that two members of a charitable or-
ganization had the same basic interests in enforcing a public charitable trust
as did members of the general public. 175 For this reason, the members of the
organization had no standing to intervene in a suit for the appointment of a
receiver for the organization when the attorney general represented the in-
terests of the general public. 176 The court determined that the organization
was a public charitable trust under article 4412a of the Texas Revised Civil
Statutes 177 because of the stated charitable purposes in the organization's
articles of incorporation.178
D. Successor Fiduciaries
In NCNB Texas National Bank v. Cowden 179 the Fifth Circuit examined
the role of successor corporate fiduciaries following the failure of a commer-
cial bank and the sale of the bank's assets, including its trust and estate
accounts, to another bank. When the forty banks owned or controlled by
First RepublicBank Corporation failed in July 1988, NCNB acquired the
deposits, assets, liabilities and other obligations of the failed banks from a
bridge bank formed by FDIC to serve as First RepublicBank's temporary
successor.' 80 The purchase and assumption agreement between the bridge
bank and NCNB included the transfer of the trust department of First
RepublicBank Midland to NCNB. 181 The agreement specifically provided
that NCNB would immediately, without any additional action, assume the
role as successor fiduciary of the estates and trusts managed by First Repub-
licBank Midland. Among the estates and trusts under administration at that
time were the Estate of B.T. Cowden and five trusts with Cowden family
members as beneficiaries. None of the trust instruments provided for the
succession as Trustee in the event of the failure of First RepublicBank Mid-
land, although each instrument provided for the resignation and appoint-
ment of a successor trustee. When NCNB attempted to make distributions
174. 792 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
175. Id. at 812.
176. Id.
177. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4412a (Vernon 1976).
178. 792 S.W.2d at 812. The articles of incorporation stated that the purposes for the
organization included to "operate exclusively for charitable" and other purposes, and to pro-
mote research for finding the "cause, cure and prevention of Multiple Sclerosis. .. ." Id
179. 895 F.2d 1488 (5th Cir. 1990).
180. The FDIC chartered an interim bridge bank to receive the deposits, assets, liabilities
and other obligations of the forty failed banks and entered into separate purchase and assump-
tion agreements with the bridge bank for each of the forty failed banks. On the same day, the
FDIC and the bridge bank entered into an agreement with NCNB for NCNB to purchase the
deposits, assets, liabilities and other obligations of the failed banks.
181. As the court noted in the text of its opinion and accompanying footnote, the trust
department of First RepublicBank Midland served as executor or administrator of some eight-
een estates and as trustee of some nine hundred trusts, with total assets under administration
of approximately $430 million. 895 F.2d at 1491 n.4. The trust departments of the other
failed banks that NCNB acquired had a combined total of approximately $50 billion under
administration in more than 1,000 decedent and guardianship estates, 17,000 individual trusts
and 9,000 employee benefit and corporate trusts. Id at 1493.
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from three of the Cowden trusts, the beneficiaries refused to recognize
NCNB's ability to do so. NCNB and FDIC subsequently brought this ac-
tion to determine whether NCNB was the successor to First RepublicBank
Midland's fiduciary appointments. The district court held that NCNB was
the successor trustee to First RepublicBank Midland in the Cowden
trusts.' 8 2 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit first determined that neither FDIC
nor the bridge bank could transfer First RepublicBank's fiduciary appoint-
ments to NCNB under Texas law.'8 3 The court next focused on whether
Congress granted FDIC authority to transfer fiduciary appointments to a
bridge bank and ultimately to a successor bank in the bridge bank statute.18 4
The court concluded that Congress granted this authority 8 5 and that the
bridge bank statute thus preempted Texas law. 186 The court further con-
cluded that any federal preemption resulting from application of the bridge
bank statute is narrow, affecting successor fiduciary appointments only when
FDIC utilizes a purchase and assumption agreement for maintaining and
continuing the failed bank's operations.18 7
E. Constructive Trust
In University of Texas Medical Branch v. Allan '88 the court held the antic-
ipated settlement of an insurance claim an asset of a bankrupt's estate, but,
due to the bankrupt's pre-petition assignment of the anticipated insurance
proceeds, the funds were subject to a constructive trust in favor of the hospi-
tal assignee.' 8 9 The insurance company paid a claim directly to the hospital
after the patient executed an assignment of insurance proceeds to the hospi-
tal at the time of surgery. The insurance company later determined that the
surgical procedure was not necessary and requested that the hospital return
the funds. The hospital returned the funds and sought recovery directly
from the patient. The patient filed suit against the insurance company and
182. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. Cowden, 712 F. Supp. 1249, 1257 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
183. 895 F.2d at 1496. The court found that Texas law prohibits the delegation or transfer
of fiduciary responsibilities unless the will or trust agreement specifically provides the fiduciary
with the authority to do so. Id. at 1495. In the absence of such authority, successor fiducia-
ries succeed according to statute. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 115.001 (Vernon 1984) provides
that a state district court has jurisdiction to appoint a successor trustee upon application by an
interested person under § 113.083(a). TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 154A(a) (Vernon 1980) pro-
vides for the appointment of a successor independent administrator.
184. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(i) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n) (1989).
185. 895 F.2d at 1498-1501. The Fifth Circuit found four reasons for concluding that Con-
gress gave FDIC the scope to transfer fiduciary appointments to successor banks. Id. at 1499.
First, the court found that Congress would be unlikely to authorize the transfer of fiduciary
accounts without transferring the fiduciary appointments and corresponding duties and re-
sponsibilities. Next, the court found that a fiduciary appointment could itself be considered an
asset subject to transfer to a successor bank. Third, other federal courts have approved
FDIC's transfers of rights held by failed banks to successor banks even though those rights
would not have been transferable under applicable state law. Finally, the court found that the
bridge bank statute clearly states Congressional intent that FDIC have the ability to transfer
all parts of a failed bank's business and operations to a newly created bridge bank. Id.
186. Id. at 1501.
187. Id. at 1503.
188. 777 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
189. Id. at 454.
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later filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Following the patient's dis-
charge in bankruptcy, the insurance company entered into a settlement with
the patient on her claim. The hospital intervened and the insurance com-
pany interpled the settlement funds. The trial court entered summary judg-
ment in favor of the patient and the hospital appealed. The appeals court
determined that although the patient, and ultimately the bankruptcy trustee,
retained the legal title to the insurance claim, the equitable title belonged to
the hospital because of the assignment. 190 The court found that the claim
belonged to the bankruptcy estate subject to a constructive trust in favor of
the hospital; the discharge in bankruptcy did not deprive the hospital of its
equitable interest in the insurance proceeds. 191
In Welder v. Welder 192 the court affirmed the trial court's judgment
notwithstanding the verdict that the husband did not hold a portion of his
separate real property in constructive trust for his wife. 193 The court found
no evidence that the husband engaged in any wrongdoing concerning the
properties or that he would be unjustly enriched by retaining his separate
property. 194 The court also found, based upon the jury's findings, that the
husband did not make a gift of any part of the real property to his wife, nor
did he represent to his wife that they owned the real property jointly. 195
In Powers v. McDanie1196 the court considered the issue of the statute of
limitations in a constructive trust case. The plaintiff attempted to recover
title to acreage and a trailer house that she contended she had purchased and
allowed her son to use. The son took title to the property in his own name,
lived on the property for several years, paid the ad valorem taxes on the
property, and ran cattle on the property. When the son died, the plaintiff
found that title to the property was in her son's name rather than her own.
The mother sued her son's widow individually and as executrix of the son's
estate to recover title to the property. The trial court entered a directed
verdict against the plaintiff, citing the expiration of the statute of limitations.
The appeals court first noted that the statute of limitations in a constructive
trust situation begins running at the inception of the constructive trust. 197
The court then stated the rule that a fraudulent concealment of facts will toll
the statute of limitations until discovery of the fraudulent concealment or
until the beneficiary of the constructive trust could have discovered the
fraudulent concealment had the beneficiary used reasonable diligence. 198
The court found that the plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to toll the
190. Id.
191. Id. The court also stated that the patient would be unjustly enriched if allowed to
retain the proceeds; equity thus imposed a constructive trust on the insurance proceeds. Id at
455.
192. 794 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
193. Id at 434. This appeal results from a divorce decree.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 785 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
197. Id. at 918. The son bought the acreage in question in 1969 and began living on the
property at that time. The plaintiff claimed that she bought the property with her son's assist-




statute of limitations' 99 and affirmed the trial court's directed verdict against
the plaintiff.200
199. Id. at 919. The court examined the plaintiff's pleadings to determine whether she
alleged a fiduciary relationship sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. The court based its
analysis of the pleadings on the supreme court's description of the discovery rule in Woods v.
William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517-18 (Tex. 1988). The court found that the
plaintiff's pleadings alleged only that she trusted and relied upon her son and stated that,
although the jury in the trial court found that a confidential relationship existed in 1973, no
evidence of the confidential relationship existed prior to 1969. 785 S.W.2d at 919. The court
also found that the plaintiff did not establish that her son concealed facts from her, which
would have triggered the tolling of the statute of limitations, nor did the plaintiff expend any
effort to determine facts concerning the title to the property while her son was alive. Id.
200. Id. at 920.
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